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ABSTRACT
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) and private information retrieval
(PIR) are classic cryptographic primitives used to hide the
access pattern to data whose storage has been outsourced
to an untrusted server. Unfortunately, both primitives re-
quire considerable overhead compared to plaintext access.
For large-scale storage infrastructure with highly frequent
access requests, the degradation in response time and the ex-
orbitant increase in resource costs incurred by either ORAM
or PIR prevent their usage. In an ideal scenario, a privacy-
preserving storage protocols with small overhead would be
implemented for these heavily trafficked storage systems to
avoid negatively impacting either performance and/or costs.
In this work, we study the problem of the best storage ac-
cess privacy that is achievable with only small overhead over
plaintext access.
To answer this question, we consider differential privacy
access which is a generalization of the oblivious access se-
curity notion that are considered by ORAM and PIR. Quite
surprisingly, we present strong evidence that constant over-
head storage schemes may only be achieved with privacy
budgets of ϵ = Ω(logn). We present asymptotically opti-
mal constructions for differentially private variants of both
ORAM and PIR with privacy budgets ϵ = Θ(logn)with only
O(1) overhead. In addition, we consider a more complex
storage primitive called key-value storage in which data is
indexed by keys from a large universe (as opposed to consec-
utive integers in ORAM and PIR).We present a differentially
private key-value storage scheme with ϵ = Θ(logn) and
O(log logn) overhead. This construction uses a new oblivi-
ous, two-choice hashing scheme that may be of independent
interest.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Privacy-preserving storage primitives consider the outsourc-
ing of the storage of a database to an untrusted server with
the ability for clients to retrieve database recordswhilemain-
taining the privacy of the retrievals. Even though encryp-
tion can be used to hide the content of the database, patterns
of how the encrypted data is accessed are revealed. The leak-
age of access patterns has been shown to compromise pri-
vacy in many important practical settings [14, 32]. Privacy-
preserving storage primitives that guarantee retrieval pri-
vacy have been used as a critical component in many sys-
tems such as advertisement [30], discovery of identities [8]
and publish-subscribe [18]. Therefore, a very important ques-
tion involves the construction of privacy-preserving storage
schemes guaranteeing retrieval privacy while ensuring that
record retrieval can be performed efficiently.
A common way to formulate the privacy of retrievals is
obliviousness. Obliviousness guarantees that for any two fixed
sequences of record retrievals of the same length, any adver-
sary that views all accesses to stored data cannot determine
which of the two sequences induced the resulting access pat-
tern to stored data. Obliviousness has been considered with
both statistical security, providing protection from adver-
saries with unbounded computational resources, and com-
putational security, where the adversary is assumed to be
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT).Oblivious RAM (ORAM)
and private information retrieval (PIR) are two oblivious
storage primitives that have been the objective of extensive
research [12, 19, 25–28, 35, 36, 44, 48]. For ORAM, it has
been shown thatΩ(logn) overhead is necessary [37]. On the
other hand, the best constructions for PIR require at least
Ω(n) server computation over the entire outsourced data-
base.
For integral storage infrastructure that handle many ac-
cess requests per second, the increased response time and
server costs caused by the usage of ORAM and PIR prevent
their implementation in these important systems. In a per-
fect world, there would exist a storage scheme with strong
privacywith only small overhead that could be implemented
for these frequently accessed storage infrastructures with-
out negatively affecting the performance and/or expenses.
In our work, we address the natural question of the best
privacy that may be achieved by any storage scheme with
only small overhead compared to plaintext access. To our
knowledge, our work is the first that considers the question
of maximizing privacy for a specific efficiency goal. Previ-
ous works consider minimizing the efficiency for primitives
with a specific privacy notion.
To consider this problem, we use another formulation for
storage access privacy through differential privacy [22–24].
Typically, differential privacy is used in the context of privacy-
preserving data analysis where global properties of the en-
tire database are disclosed while maintaining the privacy
of individual database records. In particular, differential pri-
vacy guarantees that any fixed disclosure is just as likely,
usually within a multiplicative factor, regardless of whether
an individual belonged to the sample population or not. Our
work focuses on the notion of differentially private access
which attempts to maintain privacy for individual record
retrievals, but may reveal information about the entire se-
quence of retrievals. Roughly speaking, differential privacy
guarantees that any sequence of accesses to stored data caused
by the execution of a sequence of record retrievals will be
just as likely, except for a multiplicative factor, caused by
another sequence attained by replacing a single retrieval
for a database record with a single retrieval for any other
database record. Differentially private access is a general-
ization of oblivious access as oblivious access is achieved by
fixing the differential privacy parameters to be ϵ = 0 and
δ = negl(n).
With this definition, readers might now ask the following
two questions. When does differentially private accessmake
sense as a security notion? Or, might there exist a stronger
security notion that is achievable with small overhead?
To answer the first question, we revisit the scenario of
privacy-preserving data analysis on outsourced databases.
In these scenarios, there is no sense in using storage schemes
providing obliviousness to hide entire record retrieval se-
quences when differentially private disclosures only main-
tain privacy for single records. For example, suppose we
wish to disclose a differentially private model trained over a
sample from the database. Obliviousness would unnecessar-
ily hide the identity of the entire retrieved sample at a high
cost yet the differential privacy would guarantee the privacy
about individuals in the sample. Therefore, differentially pri-
vate access is the privacy notion that is complementary to
differential privacy disclosures on outsourced databases. In
general, differentially private access guarantees privacy for
individual retrievals. For the second question, recent work
by Persiano and Yeo [47] show thatΩ(logn) overhead is nec-
essary for differentially private RAMs with parameters of
ϵ = O(1) and δ ≤ 1/3. Therefore, the task of finding good
parameters for differential privacy that provide both mean-
ingful privacy as well as while permitting small overhead
seems non-trivial.
We study differentially private variants of both PIR and
ORAM. PIR enables clients to obliviously retrieve database
records outsourced to a server. In PIR, both the client and
the server are stateless which means that no information
may be maintained between multiple record retrievals be-
yond the server storing the database. Since both the client
and the server are stateless, PIR requires the server to per-
form an operation on each database record: if a record is
not involved in computing the server’s reply, then it cannot
be the record retrieved by the client. The majority of PIR
constructions use homomorphic encryption [2, 4] or other
expensive encryptions with useful properties [12, 25, 36].
Some recent works consider PIR with stateful clients [46]
or super-linear server storage [10, 13, 31]. All single-server
PIR schemes consider computational security. PIR has also
been studied in the multiple, non-colluding server setting
where constructions only require servers to perform com-
putation sublinear in the number of database records and
provide statistical security [7, 19].
On the other hand, ORAMallows both the client and server
to be stateful and maintain information between multiple
queries and allows the client to performboth record retrievals
and overwrites. Additionally, ORAM allows a setup phase
where the untrusted server receives an encrypted version
of the database to store and the client is given a secret key.
As a result of state, the server is no longer required to per-
form computation on every database record. With this effi-
ciency, themajority of ORAM schemes consider only simple
upload and download operations and forego the use of ex-
pensive encryption schemes of PIR that require the server
to perform untrusted computation, although some previous
works consider ORAM with homomorphic encryption [20].
For a database with n records, it has been shown that ORAM
requires overhead ofΩ(logn) records [27, 37] and thatO(logn·
log logn) communication suffices [44]. We also examine an
extension to ORAM, which we denote as oblivious key-value
storage (previously also denoted as oblivious storage), where
database records are uniquely identified by keys from a large
universe and clients might also attempt to retrieve a non-
existent key [29].
In ourwork, we study the differentially private variants of
these three primitives, which we denote as differentially pri-
vate information retrieval (DP-IR), differentially private RAM
(DP-RAM) and differentially private key value storage (DP-KVS).
We focus on the question the best privacy that can be achieved
by each of these primitives that only require small overhead
over plaintext access.
OurContributions.We present both negative and positive
results for bothDP-IR and DP-RAM as well as other natural
variants of these primitives.
Our lower bounds for DP-IR and DP-RAM apply for a
wide range of privacy budgets when the database is stored in
a natural encoding. In particular, we consider the balls and
bins model of storage (previously considered in [11, 15, 27])
where each database record is considered as an opaque ball
along with a key containing important metadata. While not
covering all database encodings, in our opinion, the balls
and bins models encompasses all natural database represen-
tations that maximize practical utility and efficiency. In par-
ticular, the contents of each record are assumed to be placed
together, which is typically done to maximize data locality.
For positive results, we show that a class of simple con-
structions are optimal for large sets of privacy budgets. These
schemes may be viewed as inserting noise into the sequence
of record retrievals and/or overwrites. In particular, the real
record retrievals and/or overwrites are disguised within a
set that also contain fake record retrievals and/or overwrites.
These schemes suffice to construct the best privacy-preserving
storage protocolswith very small overhead forDP-IR,DP-RAM
and DP-KVS. While our constructions are simple, we draw
attention to the fact that designing differentially private stor-
age systems is delicate evenwith weak security notions. Some
simple constructions are very appealing and, at first, seem to
match our lower bounds. However, many variants of simple
constructions (including our constructions) end up being
completely insecure. As an example, in Section 4, we con-
sider a simple and tempting DP-IR construction and show
that it only guarantees differential privacy with δ → 1,
i.e., no privacy at all. Additionally, while our constructions
are simple, the security proofs end up being quite involved
(especially for DP-RAM). Furthermore, to handle the addi-
tional functionalities ofDP-KVS, a more complex algorithm
using a novel, oblivious adaptation of the two-choice hash-
ing scheme [41] is required.
DP-IR Results. To our knowledge, previous works onDP-IR
consider only themultiple, non-colluding server scenarios [49].
Our work is the first to consider DP-IR in the single server
scenario.
We show that for any ϵ-DP-IR that must always output
the right answer and any value of ϵ ≥ 0, then the server
must operate on all storedn records. This result is very strong
and somewhat surprising as there does not exist any weak-
ening of privacy that will improve the server computational
costs.
Theorem1.1 (informal). For any ϵ, δ ≥ 0, any (ϵ, δ )-DP-IR
scheme in the balls and bins model must operate on (1 − δ )n
records.
On the other hand, we show that this strong negative re-
sult may be circumvented by considering DP-IR schemes
with non-zero error probabilities 0 < α ≤ 1. Here, the er-
ror probability is over the internal randomness of theDP-IR
scheme and does not depend on the queries and/or stored
data. For this case, we present the following weaker lower
bound.
Theorem1.2 (informal). For any ϵ, δ ≥ 0, any (ϵ, δ )-DP-IR
scheme in the balls and bins model with error probability α >
0 must operate on
Ω
( (1 − α − δ ) · n
eϵ
)
records.
As we are focusing on schemes with very small overhead,
the above theorem leads credulence that there might exist a
ϵ-DP-IR schemewith some small, constant error probability
α > 0 that only performsO(1) operationswhen ϵ = Θ(logn).
We show that there exists a simple construction with these
properties.
Theorem 1.3 (informal). There exists an ϵ-DP-IR with
ϵ = Θ(logn) and constant error probability α > 0 that only
operates on O(1) records.
Due to our lower bounds, the above construction seems
to be the best privacy that can be achieved by any DP-IR
with only constant overhead compared to plaintext storage
access.
We also consider natural extensions of our DP-IR with
multiple, non-colluding servers. There exist several multiple-
server PIR schemes [7, 19] in literature. In our full paper, we
present asymptotically tight lower bounds for the construc-
tions in [49].
DP-RAM Results. For DP-RAM, we once again start with
describing our lower bound results. Unlike DP-IR, there is
no separation between the best lower bound for perfectly
correctDP-RAM and DP-RAMwith error probability α > 0.
We now present our DP-RAM lower bound which applies
for all values 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Theorem 1.4 (informal). For any ϵ ≥ 0, any ϵ-DP-RAM
with error probability α ≥ 0 in the balls and bins model and
a client that stores at most c blocks must operate on
Ω
(
logc
( (1 − α) · n
eϵ
))
records.
The above theorem essentially states that there are two
ways that one can achieve very efficient ϵ-DP-RAM con-
structions: either increase the amount of client storage (c)
or increase the privacy budget (ϵ). In most scenarios, it is
impractical to suppose that the client can store large por-
tions of data. As our desire is to construct schemes that
should be easily usable in complex systems, we minimize
the requirements of our clients by assuming clients have
very small amounts of storage. In [47], an Ω(log(n/c)) lower
bound is given for constant ϵ and δ ≤ 1/3. However, their
lower bound can be generalized to Ω(log(n/c)/eϵ ) for any
ϵ ≥ 0. Their lower bound has an exponentially worse de-
pendence on ϵ compared to our lower bound. For example,
the lower bound in [47] does not preclude the existence of
a ϵ-DP-RAM with ϵ = Θ(log logn) and constant overhead.
On the other hand, our lower bound improves the privacy
budget lower bound showing that an ϵ-DP-RAM that oper-
ates on O(1) records must have ϵ = Ω(logn). We show the
existence of a constant overhead ϵ-DP-RAMwith asymptot-
ically optimal ϵ = Θ(logn) privacy.
Theorem1.5 (informal). There exists an ϵ-DP-RAMwith
ϵ = Θ(logn) that only operates on O(1) records.
Once again, this construction seems to be the best pri-
vacy that can be achieved by any DP-RAM scheme with
only O(1) overhead over the baseline, unprotected storage
access due to our lower bounds. Our scheme improves on
prevous DP-RAM schemes in [50] which starts from Path
ORAM [48] and degrades security to improve efficiency. For
their scheme to achieve even client storage of O(√n), their
construction recursively stores position maps which costs
both logarithmic overhead and client-to-server roundtrips.
On the other hand, our DP-RAM construction uses both
O(1) overhead and roundtrips while achieving small client
storage.
DP-KVS Results. Finally, we consider DP-KVS which is
an extension of DP-RAM. As a result, all DP-RAM lower
bounds also apply to DP-KVS. Therefore, the best construc-
tion that is achievable byDP-KVSwithO(1) overhead could
be ϵ = Θ(logn). Due to the difficulties of handling a larger
universe of queries and possibility that clients request on-
existent keys, we present a construction with slightly worse
than constant overhead. In addition, we can only achieve
privacy in the approximate differential privacy framework.
Theorem 1.6 (informal). There exists a ϵ-DP-KVS with
ϵ = Θ(logn) that operates on O(log logn) records.
While the schemehas non-constant overhead, theO(log logn)
overhead is exponentially smaller than the best oblivious
key-value storage schemes based on ORAMs.
To construct ourDP-KVS scheme,we present an improved,
oblivious variant of the power of two choices hashing scheme [41]
that may be of separate, independent interest. Traditional
power of two choices hashing guarantees that bins do not
exceedO(log logn) items except with probability negligible
in n. Our desired oblivious variant must hide the sizes of
bins. Oneway to hide bin sizes is to pad all bins with dummy
items up to a maximum. This technique requires padding all
n bins to O(log logn) items meaning O(n log logn) storage.
By using a tree-like structure to allow bins to share storage,
we present a new scheme using O(n) storage.
RelatedWork.DP-RAMwas considered previously in [50]
which present a construction based on PathORAM[48]. How-
ever, their scheme requires recursively stored position maps
which requires Θ(logn) client-to-server roundtrips to get
client storage of even O(√n). We present DP-RAM schemes
that only requireO(1) overhead with small client storage. A
construction of DP-IR in the multiple, non-colluding server
scenario was considered in [49], which we show is optimal
for certain parameters. Lower bounds forDP-RAM have been
considered in [47], which are stronger and weaker in dif-
ferent dimensions. Their lower bound has an exponentially
worse dependence on the privacy budget, ϵ . On the other
hand, their lower bound applies to general storage encod-
ingswhereas ourwork only apply to the balls and binsmodel.
A variant of DP-RAM that only maintains privacy for data-
base record insertions is considered in [15]. A privacy no-
tion stronger than obliviousness is considered in [34] where
accesses are protected using obliviousness while the num-
ber of accesses is protected using differential privacy. Oblivi-
ousness has been considered for other problems such as sort-
ing [3, 6] and shuffling [43, 45, 51]. The problem of relaxing
the security notion of obliviousness to differential privacy
has also been studied in the context of multi-party protocols.
A simple multi-party protocol for single-bit inputs is shown
in [33] that maximizes the accuracy for any privacy bud-
get. The multi-party computation problem for larger input
sizes is studied in [39]. Additionally, the problem of differen-
tially private disclosure of specific analysis such as subspace
clustering [52], deep learning [1] andmany others have also
been studied where the database is assumed to be stored on
a trusted server.
2 DEFINITIONS
We suppose the databaseD containsn records denotedB1, . . . ,Bn .
We will interchangeably use the terms records and blocks.
We will refer to a query as a single operation involving ei-
ther a record retrieval or overwrite and a query sequence
as a list consisting of record retrievals and/or overwrites.
We use [n] to refer to the set {1, . . . ,n}. We refer to Q as
the space of all possible queries and let Q1,Q2 ∈ Ql be two
query sequences of length l . We define the Hamming dis-
tance between Q1 andQ2, which we denote by d(Q1,Q2), as
the number of queries where Q1 and Q2 differ.
2.1 Storage Primitives
The information retrieval (IR) primitive stores a database D
of n equal sized records where only record retrievals are al-
lowed. The initialization of IR consists of the server receiv-
ing D = (B1, . . . ,Bn) and simply processing and storing D.
The server is only allowed to store the database and may
not keep any other information between multiple queries.
Similarly, the client is stateless and may not use any storage
between multiple queries. A query to IR is described using
an integer q ∈ [n], which is interpreted as retrieving record
Bq . We denote two query sequences Q1,Q2 ∈ [n]l as adja-
cent if their Hamming distance is exactly 1. That is, Q1 and
Q2 retrieve a different record at exactly one query.
The random access memory (RAM) primitive will store a
database D of n equal sized records where both record re-
trievals and overwrites are permitted. The initialization of
RAM consists of a setup phase consisting of a protocol run
between the client and the server. The client will receive
a private key, process D using the private key and send the
processed database to the server to store. Both the client and
server may be stateful and maintain information between
multiple queries. A query to RAM is a pair q = (i, op)where
i ∈ [n] refers to record Bi and op ∈ {read,write} describes
whether the query is a retrieval or overwrite. Two query se-
quences Q1,Q2 ∈ ([n] × {read,write})l are adjacent if their
Hamming distance is exactly 1. That is, at exactly one query,
Q1 andQ2 operate on a different record and/or perform a dif-
ferent operation.
Finally, the key-value storage (KVS) primitive is an exten-
sion to RAM. Queries to KVS consist of a pair q = (k, op)
where k ∈ U is the key and U is universe of all keys and
op ∈ {read,write} refers to whether the query is a retrieval
or overwrite. Unlike RAM, the universe of keys is very large
and might be exponentially larger than the number of oper-
ations that will be performed. Furthermore, a retrieval oper-
ation q = (k, read) may request a key k that has never been
previoulsy inserted into the storage protocol. In this case,
the KVS protocol should output ⊥. Identical to RAM, two
query sequences Q1,Q2 ∈ (U × {read,write})l are adjacent
if there exists exactly one query that operates on a different
key and/or performs a different operation.
We note that IR, RAM and KVS are the most studied stor-
age primitives to provide oblivious access. There are many
other extensions to these primitives that have also been stud-
ied [9, 10, 13, 16, 17, 29, 31, 38].
2.2 Differentially Private Access to Data
Our privacy notion for a storage primitive S storing a data-
base D = (B1, . . . ,Bn) with a query space Q will consider
the random variable of the view of the adversarial server for
a query sequence Q ∈ Ql of length l . With a slight abuse
of notation, we refer to the transcript, S(Q), as the random
variable of the adversary’s view on query sequence Q . The
transcript contains all movement of records performed by
the server, as well as all, possibly encrypted, records that
have been uploaded and downloaded and the initial data-
base.
Definition 2.1 (Differentially Private Access). Let S be a
storage primitive with query spaceQ.S provides (ϵ, δ )-differentially
private access if for all pairs of query sequencesQ1,Q2 ∈ Ql
of length l that are adjacent, that is d(Q1,Q2) = 1, and for
any subset S of the set of possible views of the adversary,
then the following holds:
Pr[S(Q1) ∈ S] ≤ eϵ · Pr[S(Q2) ∈ S] + δ .
Theϵ parameter is referred to as the privacy budget.When
δ = 0, the above definition is referred to as pure differential
privacy and the δ is typically dropped from notation. We
denote IR, RAM and KVS primitives that provide pure dif-
ferentially private access with privacy budget ϵ as ϵ-DP-IR,
ϵ-DP-RAM and ϵ-DP-KVS. When δ > 0, the definition is
referred to as approximate differential privacy, which is a
weakening of pure differential privacy. We denote IR, RAM
andKVS primitives that provide differentially private access
with parameters ϵ and δ as (ϵ, δ )-DP-IR, (ϵ, δ )-DP-RAM and
(ϵ, δ )-DP-KVS.
3 LOWER BOUNDS
In this section, we present negative results aboutDP-IR and
DP-RAM in the single-server setting. As DP-KVS is an ex-
tension of DP-RAM with more functionality requirements,
all DP-RAM lower bounds apply directly to DP-KVS.
3.1 Balls and Bins Model
Our lower bounds are presented in the balls and bins model
of data manipulation. The n database records are treated as
immutable, opaque balls. Each ball is associated with a mu-
table key containing metadata about the record. The formal
definition involves a serverm with storage form balls and a
clientc with storage for c balls.
Definition 3.1 (Balls and BinsModel). A clientc and serverm
operate in the balls and bins model if all client memory is
initially empty and client-server interactions are restricted
to the following:
(1) Download ball from serverm to clientc . For some i ∈
[m] and j ∈ [c], store the block at address i at serverm
in address j at clientc .
(2) Upload ball from clientc to serverm . For some i ∈ [m]
and j ∈ [c], store the block at address j at clientc in
address i at serverm .
The above definition assumes a passive server acting only
as storage. As a result, only lower bounds on communica-
tion can be proven directly. However, for algorithms with
general computation by the server, lower bounds on com-
munication in the balls and bins model may be modified to
provide lower bounds on server computation. The modifi-
cation simply views the transcript as the balls that must be
operated on by the server.
Discussion about storage model. The balls and bins model
does not include all possible encodings of databases that
may be stored. In particular, we assume that database records
are all stored together and the contents do not emit special
properties. In general, related information should be stored
in nearby memory locations so that all required data can be
found with the minimal number of cache misses. Therefore,
assuming database records are stored together captures real
world scenarios. In addition, opaque balls rule out bother-
some corner cases where non-trivial lower bounds cannot
hold such as when records are dependent and record con-
tents may be generated using superficial methods.
3.2 DP-IR
We prove our lower bounds directly for approximately dif-
ferential privacy (in this case, δ ≥ 0). However, one can
interpret the results for pure differential privacy by setting
δ = 0.
To prove our lower bounds, we first define the notion of
transcripts. For a single-server information retrieval proto-
col IR in the balls and bins model, the transcript IR(i) is the
random variable denoting the set of blocks requested when
retrieving Bi . The query algorithm of an IR algorithm in the
balls and bins model only issues download commands to the
server.
The main observation to prove the above theorem is that
the initialization phase ofDP-IR is public which implies that
the adversary has knowledge of the identity of each record.
By the restriction on correctness, the queried record must
always be retrieved. Using the privacy requirement, it turns
out all other blocks must also be retrieved. We summarize
this in the following main lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Let IR be an (ϵ, δ )-DP-IR scheme in the balls
and bins model. For any a,b, c ∈ [n],
(1) Pr[Bc ∈ IR(a)] ≤ eϵ Pr[Bc ∈ IR(b)] + δ .
(2) Pr[Bc < IR(a)] ≤ eϵ Pr[Bc < IR(b)] + δ .
Proof. Define S ⊆ Range(IR) to be all transcripts where
the block Bc is downloaded. So, for any query q,
Pr[Bc ∈ IR(q)] = Pr[IR(q) ∈ S].
By (ϵ, δ )-DP, we know
Pr[IR(a) ∈ S] ≤ eϵ Pr[IR(b) ∈ S] + δ
completing the first point. The second point follows identi-
cally if we choose S ⊆ Range(IR) to be all transcripts where
block Bc is not downloaded. 
Using the above lemma, we present very strong negative
results for DP-IR that are errorless. That is, they always re-
turn the correct record. We show the following result:
Theorem 3.3. If IR is an (ϵ, δ )-DP-IR scheme in the balls
and bins model then IR performs at least (1 − δ )n operations
in expectation.
Proof. By Lemma 3.2, we know that
Pr[Bj < IR(i)] ≤ eϵ Pr[Bj < IR(j)] + δ = δ
since IR is errorless and Pr[Bj < IR(j)] = 0. Therefore, we
know that Pr[Bj ∈ IR(i)] ≥ 1 − δ and
E[|IR(i)|] =
∑
j∈[n]
Pr[Bj ∈ IR(i)] ≥ (1 − δ )n
completing the proof. 
For algorithms with general server computation, we can
the interpret the above results as a lower bound on server
computation. This result is extremely strong since n server
operations must be executed even when increasing the pri-
vacy budget. Therefore, the relaxation to ϵ-DP-IR does not
result in any gain compared to PIR. For (ϵ, δ )-DP-IR, one
could increase δ to decrease costs. However, typical privacy
requires δ = negl(n) resulting in almost no gain.
To circumvent this result, we move to the case where
DP-IR has a non-zero error rate 0 < α ≤ 1. That is, DP-IR
will only retrieve the desired record with probability 1 − α
depending only on the internal randomness of DP-IR. Our
hope is that a very small α may significantly improve effi-
ciency of DP-IR and bypass this negative result. We show:
Theorem 3.4. If IR is an (ϵ, δ )-DP-IR scheme in the balls
and bins model with error probability α > 0, then IR performs
Ω
( (1 − α − δ ) · n
eϵ
)
operations in expectation.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Since IR has error probability at
most α , Pr[Bj ∈ IR(j)] ≥ 1−α , for all j ∈ [n]. By Lemma 3.2,
for all j , i ,
Pr[Bj ∈ IR(j)] ≤ eϵ Pr[Bj ∈ IR(i)] + δ .
Equivalently, this means that Pr[Bj ∈ IR(i)] ≥ 1−α−δeϵ . So,
E[|IR(i)|] ≥
∑
j,i
Pr[Bj ∈ IR(i)] ≥ (n − 1)
1 − α − δ
eϵ
that yields the theorem. 
For any constant error α > 0 and typical privacy budgets
of ϵ = Θ(1), errorlessDP-IR schemes require Ω(n) server op-
erations. However, it seems possible to bypass the first neg-
ative result with very small error. The above lower bound
does not preclude the existence of aϵ-DP-IRwith ϵ = Ω(logn)
and small error probability α > 0 that only requires a con-
stant number of server operations. In Section 5, we present
an ϵ-DP-IR scheme that usesO(1) communicationwhen ϵ =
O(logn). It turns out this ϵ-DP-IR scheme asymptotically
matches the lower bound for all values of ϵ ≥ 0.
We also extend our negative results forDP-IR in Section C
where we present lower bounds when outsourcing storage
to multiple, non-colluding servers.
3.3 DP-RAM
We now move to our negative results for DP-RAM. Proving
lower bounds for DP-RAM is more challenging than DP-IR
due to the private setup phase and the client’s private mem-
ory. We can no longer directly bound the probability that
blocks need to be retrieved and, instead, examine the tran-
scripts seen by the adversary. Let us fix any transcript T
that has non-zero probability of being viewed by the adver-
sary on any query sequence Q of length l . We show that
every other query sequence of length l must also induce T
with non-zero probability. In fact, the probabilities that any
two fixed query sequences induce T as the view of the ad-
versary are strong related by their Hamming distance and
the privacy budget, ϵ , as described in the following:
Lemma 3.5. Let RAM be a ϵ-DP-RAM scheme for any ϵ ≥
0. For every distributionD on query sequences of length l , ran-
dom variable D ∼ D and for any two fixed sequences Q1,Q2
such that Pr[D = Q2] > 0, then
Pr[D = Q1 | RAM(D) = T]
Pr[D = Q2 | RAM(D) = T]
≥ e−ϵ ·d (Q1,Q2) Pr[D = Q1]
Pr[D = Q2]
.
Proof. By Bayes’ law, we have
Pr[D = Q | RAM(D) = T]
=
Pr[RAM(D) = T | D = Q] Pr[D = Q]
Pr[RAM(D) = T]
≥ e−ϵ ·dH (Q,Q ′) Pr[RAM(D) = T | D = Q
′] Pr[D = Q]
Pr[RAM(D) = T]
= e−ϵ ·dH (Q,Q
′) Pr[D = Q ′ | RAM(D) = T] Pr[D = Q]
Pr[D = Q ′]
giving us our result. 
Next, we prove that if a query sequence has positive prob-
ability, then it stays so even after seeing a transcript. This
holds for all a priori query sequences distributions D.
Lemma 3.6. Let RAM be an ϵ-DP-RAM and let T be a tran-
script for which there exists at least one query sequenceQ such
that
Pr[RAM(Q) = T] > 0.
Then for all distributions D on the set of query sequences and
for all Q ′ such that Pr[D = Q ′] > 0 it holds that
Pr[D = Q ′|RAM(D) = T ] > 0.
Proof. Let Q be any query sequence such that Pr[D =
Q] > 0 and Pr[RAM(D) = T | D = Q] > 0. Assume by con-
tradiction that Pr[D = Q ′] > 0 but Pr[D = Q ′ | RAM(D) =
T] = 0 for some query sequence Q ′. By Bayes’ Law,
0 = Pr[D = Q ′ | RAM(D) = T]
=
Pr[RAM(D) = T | D = Q ′] · Pr[D = Q ′]
Pr[RAM(D) = T]
which implies that Pr[RAM(D) = T | D = Q ′] = 0. On the
other hand, by ϵ-differential privacy, we have that for all q
such that Pr[D = Q] > 0,
Pr[RAM(D) = T | D = Q]
≤ edH (Q,Q ′)ϵ · Pr[RAM(D) = T | D = Q ′] = 0
providing our contradiction. 
Weare now ready to prove ourDP-RAM lower bound. For
the sake of the completeness, we suppose that the DP-RAM
scheme only retrieves the desired block with probability at
least 1−α based only on internal randomness.We show that:
Theorem 3.7. If RAM is an ϵ-DP-RAM scheme in the balls
and bins model with error probability α ≥ 0 then RAM per-
forms
Ω
(
logc
( (1 − α) · n
eϵ
))
expected amortized operations per query when the client has
storage for c balls.
Proof. FixQ = (q1, . . . ,ql ) to be any sequence of queries
of length l > c . Then, clientc can only perform upload/
download operationswith serverM . Denote the expected amor-
tized bandwidth by k . The server locations of all operations
are given by the transcript, RAM(q). However, which of the
c client locations used for each operation remains hidden.
For each download and upload, there are c possible execu-
tion paths, one path for each of the c client memory loca-
tions. Also, after each operation, clientc may use the data
stored in any of the c client memory locations to answer a
query. Altogether, at most kl blocks of bandwidth are used
for all l queries. Therefore, there are at most c2kl different
sequences of blocks that may be returned. Since RAM can
only fail with α probability for each query, it must satisfy at
least (1−α)lnl different access patterns. So, c2kl ≥ (1−α)lnl .
Let T be any transcript with positive probability and con-
sider the uniform distribution U over the set [n]l of query
sequences of length l . By Lemma 3.6, there exists Q ∈ [n]l
such that
Pr[U = Q | RAM(U ) = T] ≥ 1
nl
≥ (1 − α)
l
c2kl
.
For every Q ′ , Q , by Lemma 3.5, we have
Pr[U = Q ′ | RAM(U ) = T ] ≥ e−lϵ (1 − α)
l
c2kl
.
Finally, we know that
1 ≥
∑
Q ′,Q
Pr[U = Q ′ | RAM(U ) = T] ≥ e−lϵ (nl − 1) (1 − α)
l
c2kl
completing the proof. 
UnlikeDP-IR, we do not need a non-zero error probability
to get a constant overhead scheme. From the above lower
bound, it seems like the best one can achieve is a perfectly
correct ϵ-DP-RAMwith ϵ = Θ(logn) that only requiresO(1)
overhead with small client storage. In Section 6, we show
that such a scheme does exist.
Discussion about lower bounds. It has been shown that pre-
vious ORAM lower bounds come with many cavaets. The
first lower bound [27] in the balls and bins model was for
statistical security as pointed out in [11]. The assumption
of statistical security is troublesome due to the fact that all
ORAM schemes require the use of encryption which only
provides computational security. To abstract away this issue,
it is assumed that records were opaque balls and were hid-
den even against computationally unbounded adversaries.
However, this abstraction was still not sufficient since the
majority of ORAM schemes still required the use of pseu-
dorandom functions. Furthermore, the DP-RAM construc-
tions of [50] and [15] require encryption and are burdened
by the same cavaets. We explain why these issues do not
apply to our results. In our work, we consider typical differ-
ential privacy notions (not the computational variants de-
scribed in [40]) where adversaries are computationally un-
bounded. Our DP-RAM scheme in Section 6 when only al-
lowing retrievals does not require encryption and provides
differentially private access to public data against compu-
tationally unbounded adversaries. All ORAM schemes still
require encryption even when only retrievals are permitted.
In the case that we wish to store encrypted data or protect
overwrites in our DP-RAM scheme, we must apply the ab-
straction of opaque balls to go around encryption. With this
abstraction, our DP-RAM scheme is differentially private.
Recent results in [37] present Ω(log(n/c)) lower bounds for
ORAMagainst computational adversaries with passive servers
and general storage schemes. Furthermore, work in [47] ex-
tends the lower bound for (ϵ, δ )-DP-RAM where ϵ = O(1)
and δ ≤ 1/3. However, the lower bounds in [47] have an
exponentially worse dependency on ϵ compared to our re-
sults.
4 AN INSECURE CONSTRUCTION
Before presenting our constructions, we consider a simple
and tempting, but insecure, construction. The lower bounds
presented in Section 3 show that the best privacy any con-
stant overhead storage primitive can achieve will be ϵ =
Θ(logn). With such weak privacy requirements, it might
seem very easy to construct these primitives at first. We
caution that schemes with these weak privacy requirements
must be constructed carefully as slight variants of our later
schemes could also end up being insecure. To our knowl-
edge, our schemes are the simplest constructions that achieve
ϵ = Θ(logn) differential privacy and small overhead.
The main idea of the strawman solution derives from the
fact that ϵ = Θ(logn). As a result, the desired block should
be queried with probability amultiplicative factor of poly(n)
larger to compared to any other block. To achieve this, one
could query the desired blockwith probability 1 and all other
blocks with probability 1/n. This scheme would have O(1)
bandwidth in expectation, perfect correctness and no client
storage requirements. However, we show that this scheme
is really an (ϵ, δ )-DP-IR with ϵ = Θ(logn) and δ = (n− 1)/n.
Denote the above scheme by IR and IR(i) the set of blocks re-
turnedwhen querying for i . Pick any two queries i , j . Note,
Pr[Bi < IR(i)] = 0 and Pr[Bi < IR(j)] = (n − 1)/n. Then, (n −
1)/n = Pr[Bi < IR(j)] ≤ eϵ Pr[Bi < IR(i)] + δ which means
that δ ≥ (n − 1)/n. Therefore, the above scheme would not
provide as much privacy as possible as δ approaches 1 as n
increases.
We use the above strawman to show that attentiveness
and rigor are required when constructing differentially pri-
vate storage schemes even with such weak privacy guaran-
tees. The schemes that we will present for DP-IR, DP-RAM
and DP-KVS are the simplest algorithms that, to our knowl-
edge, achieve our desired privacy of ϵ = Θ(logn) and small
overhead in efficiency.
5 DP-IR CONSTRUCTION
For errorless DP-IR, the asymptotically optimal balls and
bins algorithms is required to download the entire database
regardless of the privacy budget. With active servers that
can perform computation, servers must perform n opera-
tions which is identical to PIR. Therefore, there is no reason
to use differentially private accesswhen oblivious access has
the same efficiency.
We now move to the more interesting case of DP-IR with
errors. By introducing a small amount of error α > 0, we
hope to find algorithms more efficient than PIR for larger
privacy budgets where our lower bounds from Section 3 no
longer hold. We show that the simplest algorithm ends up
being optimal. In particular, the client will download the de-
sired block as well as several other blocks simultaneously.
The hope is that the adversary cannot determine the real
retrieval from all the fake retrievals. In addition, with prob-
ability α , we only perform fake retrievals and error. The
pseudocode of this scheme can be found in Appendix G. The
proof of the following theorem is found in Appendix B
Theorem 5.1. For any ϵ ≥ 0, there exists a ϵ-DP-IR that
returns O(n/eϵ ) blocks for any constant error probability α >
0.
The above upper bound asymptoticallymatches the lower
bound of Theorem 3.4 for all values of ϵ ≥ 0. Furthemore, by
fixing the privacy budget to be ϵ = Θ(logn), we can achieve
a constant overhead DP-IR scheme with the best privacy ac-
cording to Theorem 3.4.
6 DP-RAM CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we give an errorless construction DP-RAM
supporting both retrieval and overwrite operations. Before
describing our DP-RAM scheme, we note that one could
also use the DP-IR scheme from Section 5 as a DP-RAM
scheme without any client storage requirements. However,
this DP-IR scheme has non-zero error probabilities which is
inherently unavoidable for DP-IR due to our lower bounds
in Section 3. On the other hand, our DP-RAM lower bounds
do not preclude the existence of a perfectly correctDP-RAM
scheme with ϵ = Θ(logn). In this section, we work towards
constructing such a DP-RAM scheme.
Our scheme will require the client to store some records
in a local stash. Our DP-RAM scheme is parameterized by
a probability p describing the independent probability that
each record is stored in the stash. We assume that (Enc,Dec)
is an IND-CPA symmetric-key encryption scheme. The server’s
storage will consist of an array, A, of n records.
The setup phase ofDP-RAMwill consist of populating the
server-stored array A. For security parameter λ, key K →
{0, 1}λ is randomly selected.A is initialized by settingA[i] =
Enc(K ,Bi ) for i ∈ [n]. The stash is initialized by indepen-
dently selecting each record to be in the stash with probabil-
ity p. In addition, the client keeps the key K in local storage.
The querying (either retrieval or overwrite) for a record
Bi consists of two phases: the download phase followed by
the overwrite phase. In the download phase, the client looks
for Bi in the stash. If Bi is found, then Bi is removed and
returned. The client asks the server for A[j], with j chosen
uniformly at random from [n]. If, instead, Bi is not in the
stash, the client asks the server for A[i] that contains an en-
cryption of Bi . If the client is performing a write operation,
then Bi is updated with the new version. At this point, the
client holds the current version of Bi .
In the overwrite phase, the current version of Bi is added
to the stash with probability p. If Bi is stored in the stash,
then another record is randomly selected, downloaded from
the server, decrypted and then re-encrypted with fresh ran-
domness and uploaded to the server. If Bi is not stored in
the stash, then the client asks the server for A[i], discards
the record received and then uploads to A[i] a freshly com-
puted ciphertext carrying the current version of Bi .
The pseudocode of the algorithms are presented in Ap-
pendix H. We note that while the above algorithm is sim-
ple, the analysis of privacy is quite complicated. We show
the following about this scheme when p ≤ Φ(n)/n for any
Φ(n) = ω(logn):
Theorem 6.1. There exists an O(logn)-DP-RAM that re-
turnsO(1) blocks. For any function Φ(n) = ω(logn), the client
storesΦ(n) blocks of client storage except with probability negl(n).
This scheme is, essentially, the best privacy that can be
achieved by an errorless DP-RAM scheme with constant
overhead according to Theorem 3.7. Since we use encryp-
tion, our DP-RAM satisfies computational differentially pri-
vacy using simulators (see SIM-CDP in [40]). Our proof uses
a simulator that replaces all encryptions of records with ran-
domly generated contents.
Discussion about encryption. The above DP-RAM scheme as-
sumes that both record retrievals and overwrites are per-
mitted. To hide whether queries are overwrites or retrievals,
any DP-RAM scheme must use encryption. In the case that
we wish to only permit retrievals, we note that the above
DP-RAM scheme no longer requires encryption and can pro-
vide differentially private access to public data without com-
putational assumptions. In particular, the entire overwrite
phase may be skipped. Retrieval-only DP-RAM and DP-IR
only differ by their requirements on the client’s state. There-
fore, using client state is another way to bypass the strong
lower bound shown in Theorem3.3 for errorlessDP-IR schemes.
6.1 Roadmap of the Proof
To start, we show that if we choose that p ≤ c/n where c =
ω(logn), then the client will store at most O(c) blocks. The
proof is an application of Chernoff Bounds and postponed
to Appendix D.
The technical crux of the privacy analysis lies in bound-
ing the following ratio, for every transcript T seen by the
adversary, and for every two neighboring query sequences
Q and Q ′,
Pr[RAM(Q ′) = T]
Pr[RAM(Q) = T] (1)
where Pr[RAM(Q) = T] denotes the probability that RAM
executing on Q produces the transcript T . In the first step,
we show that the transcript of the adversary at a single query
on Bq is only dependent on the most recent query that also
queries for Bq . In other words, the ratio is upper bounded
by
l∏
i=1
Pr[RAMi (Q ′) = Ti | RAMpr(Q ′,i )(Q ′) = Tpr(Q ′,i )]
Pr[RAMi (Q) = Ti | RAMpr(Q,i )(Q) = Tpr(Q,i )]
where pr(Q, i) is the most recent query for block Bqi before
the i-th query. The second step consists of giving an upper
bound that holds for each factor of the product in the above
equation. The third step shows that the upper bound com-
puted in the second step is too pessimistic and that, all fac-
tors, except for 3, in the product in the right hand side of
the above equation are 1 when Q and Q ′ differ in exactly
one position.
We now proceed to define notation and terminology used
throughout our proof. First, we observe that the transcript of
an execution only includes the ciphertexts of the blocks and
not the actual content of the blocks transferred. Assuming
IND-CPA of the underlying encryption scheme (Enc,Dec),
it is straightforward to prove that, for a sequenceQ = (q1, . . . ,ql )
of l queries, the transcript generated byQ for blocksB1, . . . ,Bn
is indistinguishable from the transcript generated by the
same sequence Q for n blocks that are 0. For this reason,
we shall not consider the ciphertexts of the blocks as part
of the transcript and consider a transcript T for query se-
quence Q as a sequence T = ((d1,o1), . . . , (dl ,ol )) of l pairs
Tj = (oj ,d j ) of indices of the blocks that are accessed during
the download phase and the overwrite phase. We set T[j] =
((d1,o1), . . . , (d j ,oj )).We define RAMDj (Q) and RAMOj (Q) to
be the random variables of the indices of the download and
of the overwrite block of the j-th query for all j ∈ [l]. Also,
for S ⊆ [l]we define RAMS (Q) to be the set of random vari-
ables {RAMDj (Q),RAMOj (Q)}j∈S . Also, we set RAM(Q) :=
RAM[n](Q). It turns out to be convenient to extend the ran-
dom variable RAM for indices ±∞ by setting RAMD±∞(Q)
and RAMO±∞(Q) to be random variables that give probabil-
ity 1 to ⊥.
We also let pr(Q, j) be the index of the most recent previ-
ous query to block Bqj that happened before the j-th query
of Q ; that is, pr(Q, j) = max{i < j : qi = q j }. If query q j is
the first query of sequence Q that asks for block Bqj , then
pr(Q, j) = +∞. Similarly, we define nx(Q, j) to be the index
of the nearest next query for block Bqj ; that is, nx(Q, j) =
min{i > j : qi = qj }. If the j-th query of Q is the last query
of Q to ask for block Bqj , then nx(Q, j) = −∞.
6.2 Step I: Reducing dependencies
The next lemmas outline the dependencies of the random
variables of the download blocks and of the overwrite blocks.
We start by showing that the overwrite block of each query
is independent of all previous history and only depends on
the current query.
Lemma 6.2. For every query sequence Q of length l , for ev-
ery transcript T = ((d1,o1), . . . , (dl ,ol )) and for every j ≤ l
Pr[RAMOj (Q) = oj | RAM[j−1](Q) = T[j−1] ∧ RAMDj (Q) = d j ]
= Pr[RAMOj (Q) = oj ].
Moreover, if Q and Q ′ are two sequences with qj = q′j , then
the distributions RAMOj (Q) and RAMOj (Q ′) coincide.
Proof. The lemma follows by observing that the distri-
bution of the j-th overwrite block depends only on whether
Bqj is added to the block stash during the j-th overwrite
phase which, in turn, depends only on qj and the random
value of r in the overwrite phase of the j-th query. 
Lemma 6.3. For every query sequence Q of length l , for ev-
ery transcript T = ((d1,o1), . . . , (dl ,ol )) and for every j ≤ l ,
Pr[RAMDj (Q) = d j | RAM[j−1](Q) = T[j−1]] =
Pr[RAMDj (Q) = d j | RAMOpr(Q, j) = opr(Q, j)].
Moreover, if Q and Q ′ are two sequences with qj = q′j and
pr(Q, j) = pr(Q ′, j) then for alld ∈ [n] and for allo ∈ [n]∪{⊥
} such that Pr[RAMO
pr(Q, j) = o] > 0,
Pr[RAMDj (Q) = d | RAMOpr(Q, j) = o]
= Pr[RAMDj (Q ′) = d | RAMOpr(Q ′, j) = o].
Proof. The j-th download block of sequence Q depends
on whether Bqj is in the block stash at the start of the j-th
download phase. We distinguish two cases.
If pr(Q, j) = +∞, then block Bqj has not been queried
in the first j − 1 queries and its probability of being found
in the stash at the start of j-th download phase is equal to
the probability of being placed in the stash by RAM.Setup
which, obviously, is independent from the previous history.
Suppose instead that pr(Q, j) ∈ [j − 1]. Then the probabil-
ity that Bqj is in the stash at the beginning of the j-th query
depends only on the random variable, RAMO
pr(Q, j)(Q), of the
overwrite block of query pr(Q, j). 
The first part of Lemma 6.2 and the first part of Lemma 6.3
imply
Pr[RAMj (Q) = (d j , oj ) | RAM[j−1](Q) = T[j−1]] =
Pr[RAMDj (Q) = d j | RAM[j−1](Q) = T[j−1]]·
Pr[RAMOj (Q) = oj | RAM[j−1](Q) = T[j−1] ∧ RAMDj (Q) = d j ] =
Pr[RAMDj (Q) = d j | RAMpr(Q, j)(Q) = opr(Q, j)] · Pr[RAMOj (Q) = oj ].
Thus, we can write
Pr[RAM(Q ′) = T ]
Pr[RAM(Q) = T ] =
l∏
j=1
Pr[RAMOj (Q) = oj ]
Pr[RAMOj (Q ′) = oj ]
×
l∏
j=1
Pr[RAMDj (Q ′) = d j |RAMpr(Q ′, j)(Q) = opr(Q ′, j)]
Pr[RAMDj (Q) = d j |RAMpr(Q, j)(Q ′) = opr(Q, j)]
6.3 Step II: Upper bounding factors
In the next two lemmata, we give an upper bound on the
contribution of each j ∈ [l] to the product in the equation
above.
Lemma 6.4. LetQ andQ ′ be two query sequences of length
l . For every transcript T = ((d1,o1), . . . , (dl ,ol )) and every
j ∈ [l]
Pr[RAMDj (Q ′) = d j | RAMOpr(Q ′, j)(Q ′) = opr(Q ′, j)]
Pr[RAMDj (Q) = d j | RAMOpr(Q, j)(Q) = opr(Q, j)]
≤ n
2
p
.
Lemma 6.5. LetQ andQ ′ be two query sequences of length
l . For every transcript T = ((d1,o1), . . . , (dl ,ol )) and every
j ∈ [l]
Pr[RAMOj (Q ′) = oj ]
Pr[RAMOj (Q) = oj ]
≤ n
p
.
Both of these lemmata consider the various cases that can
occur. As the proofs are case analysis that do not provide bet-
ter intuition to the problem, we postpone them to Section D.
6.4 Step III: Identifying the many good
cases
The bounds given by Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.5 would give
an nO (l ) upper bound on the ratio in Equation 1. This is a
very weak bound as it depends on the length l of the se-
quences. In this section, we tighten the upper bound to nO (1)
which is instrumental to prove that RAM is private with
ϵ = O(logn). Specifically, the next lemma gives sufficient
conditions under which the ratio is actually 1 and then we
show that, if the two sequences only differ in one position,
then there are only three values of j for which the condi-
tions are not satisfied and for those position we use the up-
per bound of the previous section.
The following lemma follows directly from the second
parts of Lemma 6.2 and 6.3.
Lemma 6.6. For any two sequences Q and Q ′ of the same
length, every transcript T = ((d1,o1), . . . , (dl ,ol )) and every
j ∈ [l] with pr(Q, j) = pr(Q ′, j) and qj = q′j ,
Pr[RAMOj (Q) = oj ]
· Pr[RAMDj (Q) = d j | RAMOpr(Q, j)(Q) = opr(Q, j)] =
Pr[RAMOj (Q ′) = oj ]
Pr[RAMDj (Q ′) = d j | RAMOpr(Q ′, j)(Q ′) = opr(Q ′, j)].
The lemma above says that the distributions of the tran-
scripts associated with two query sequences Q and Q ′ may
differ only at indices j for which pr(Q, j) , pr(Q ′, j) or
qj , q
′
j . The next lemma identifies the indices j for which
this happens when Q and Q ′ differ in exactly one position.
Lemma 6.7. LetQ andQ ′ be two query sequences of length l
differing only at positionk ∈ [l]. If j < {k, nx(Q,k), nx(Q ′,k)},
then pr(Q, j) = pr(Q, j ′).
Proof. For j < k , we have (q1, . . . ,q j ) = (q′1, . . . ,q′j ) and
thus pr(Q, j) = pr(Q ′, j). For j > k such that qj , qk ,q′k
we have qj = q
′
j and pr(Q, j) = pr(Q ′, j). Next consider
the indices j1 < . . . < jl such that qk = q j1 = . . . = q jl .
Clearly, if l > 0 then j1 = nx(Q,k) and, for i = 2, . . . , l , we
have qji = q
′
ji
and pr(Q, ji ) = pr(Q ′, ji ). A similar argument
applies for the indices j > k such q′j = q
′
k
thus completing
the proof of the theorem. 
6.5 Wrapping up the proof
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Bounds on bandwidth and server
storage are obvious and the one on client storage follows
from Lemma D.1.
Consider sequencesQ andQ ′ of length l that differ only in
position k ∈ [l]. Let T = ((d1,o1), . . . , (dl ,ol )) be transcript.
By Lemma 6.6 and 6.7, we obtain that the ratio
Pr[RAM(Q ′)=T]
Pr[RAM(Q )=T]
is ∏
j∈S
Pr[RAMj (Q ′) = Tj |RAM[j−1] (Q ′) = T[j−1] ]
Pr[RAMj (Q) = Tj |RAM[j−1] (Q) = T[j−1] ]
where S = {k, nx(Q,k), nx(Q ′,k)}. By Lemma 6.4 and 6.5,
Pr[RAM(Q ′) = T ]
Pr[RAM(Q) = T] =
(
n
p
)O (1)
.
Since, the above holds for any single transcript, we get that
the ratio holds for any set of transcripts. This implies that
ϵ = O(logn). 
7 DP-KVS CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we present DP-KVS, our KVS construction
with privacy budget ϵ = O(logn) and small overhead. Re-
call that a KVS is an extension of RAM where each of the
n blocks is identified by a unique key taken from a possi-
bly large universe of keys U . In contrast, a block in RAM
is uniquely identified by an integer in [n]. One could use
the DP-RAM construction from Section 6, which results in
server storage on the order of |U | ≫ n. For efficiency, we
would like a DP-KVS scheme that storesO(n) blocks on the
server.
Our approach to constructing a DP-KVS scheme consists
of two steps. First, we show that we can construct aDP-KVS
scheme using aDP-RAM scheme and amapping schemewhich
associates keys in the universe U to subsets of server stor-
age. Next, we present an efficient mapping scheme by con-
structing a non-trivial oblivious variant of two-choice hash-
ing [41] that uses O(n) server storage and which may be
of independent interest. Our oblivious two-choice hashing
variant hides the number of real items that are stored in
each bin at any point in time. Finally, combined with our
DP-RAM scheme of Section 6, we present a (ϵ, δ )-DP-KVS
with ϵ = O(logn) and δ = negl(n) using only O(log logn)
overhead. While non-constant, this is exponentially better
than any previous oblivious KVS scheme built fromORAMs.
Furthermore, for all practical sizes of n, O(log logn) is very
small.
7.1 Composing Mapping Schemes and
DP-RAM
In this section, we present a generic reduction ofDP-KVS to
a mapping scheme and our DP-RAM from Section 6. First,
we define mapping schemes. Afterwards, we present the re-
duction.
A mapping scheme is defined as the tuple (Π,S) where
Π is themapping function and S is the storing algorithm. To
store n items each uniquely identified by an key from the
universe U , a mapping scheme arranges the server storage
intob(n) buckets each consisting of atmost s(n) blocks. Each
bucket is uniquely identified by an index from [b(n)]. We
note that buckets are not necessarily disjoint and the total
number of blocks may be much smaller than b(n) · s(n). In
addition, the mapping scheme assumes that the client will
hold amapping stash which will contain at most c(n) blocks
except with probability negl(n). For each item u ∈ U , the
mapping function maps u to a subset of at most s(n) buck-
ets defined by Π(u) ⊆ [b(n)]. For convenience, we denote
k(n) := maxu ∈U |Π(u)|. When inserting a new item with
identifier u, the storing algorithm S determines whether u
is placed into a bucket of Π(u) or the mapping stash accord-
ing to the sizes of buckets in Π(u). We now show how to use
mapping schemes to construct a DP-KVS.
Our DP-KVS scheme works as follows. We construct the
server storage into b(n) buckets as described by the map-
ping scheme. We build a DP-RAM to be able to query and
update the b(n) buckets. In Appendix E, we show that our
DP-RAM construction from Section 6 remains secure and
efficient when querying possibly overlapping buckets with
minor modifications. When querying our DP-KVS for a key
u ∈ U , we perform k(n) DP-RAM queries to retrieve the
s(n) blocks from each bucket in Π(u). If |Π(u)| < k(n), we
pick random buckets to pad Π(u) to size k(n). Now, we are
guaranteed that ifu exists in DP-KVS, it appears in a bucket
of Π(u) or in the mapping stash and can be thus returned.
To update an existing key, we can simply update either the
bucket or the mapping stash that contains the block asso-
ciated to key u. For insertion, we can execute the storing
algorithmS as all the contents of buckets Π(u) and the map-
ping stash are available to the client.S determines the inser-
tion location for the block associated to key u. Finally, we
execute k(n) DP-RAM updates to all buckets in Π(u). Only
the bucket containing the block associated with key u is up-
dated. The other buckets will perform fake updates where
the contents remain unchanged. For read operations, none
of the contents of buckets in Π(u)will be changed.We prove
the following theorem about our DP-KVS construction.
Theorem 7.1. For n blocks, the above KVS scheme is an
ϵ-DP-KVSwith ϵ = O(k(n)·logn) that returns atmostO(k(n)·
s(n)) blocks. For any functionΦ(n) = ω(logn), the client stores
O(s(n) · Φ(n)+ c(n)) blocks of storage except with probability
negl(n).
Proof. The bounds on bandwidth and server storage fol-
low from the mapping scheme properties. The client storage
bound follows from Lemma D.1 and the mapping scheme
properties. Each query results in at most 2 · k(n) queries
over the repertoire Σ of the n buckets. By the composition
theorem and the discussion in Appendix E, we obtain that
ϵ = O(k(n) · logn). 
7.2 Oblivious Two-Choice Hashing
Before presenting our new mapping scheme, we revisit the
two-choice hashing scheme [41] (see Section A.1 for more
details). This scheme considers n buckets to store up to n
keys. The mapping function Π : U → [n] sets Π(u) as
k(n) := 2 independently and uniformly at random chosen
buckets. Typically,Π is succintly represented using two keys,
key1, key2, of a pseudorandom function F and by Π(u) :=
{F (key1,u), F (key2,u)}. The storing algorithm S for u ∈ U ,
checks which of the two buckets in Π(u) is less loaded and
places u into the less loaded bucket. There are several dif-
ferent proofs that show that the largest bucket will contain
at most s(n) := O(log logn) items except with probability
negl(n).
Unfortunately, we are unable to use two-choice hashing
directly into our DP-KVS scheme without incurring into
a server storage blockup. The DP-KVS scheme from Sec-
tion 7.1 requires that all buckets are the same size for privacy.
The naive approach is to simply increase all buckets to the
worst case size which results in O(n log logn) server stor-
age. Instead, we now present a variant of two-choice hash-
ing which will only use O(n) server storage by arranging
buckets to share memory.
Our bucket arrangement is best described as Θ(n/logn)
identical binary trees, eachwithΘ(logn) leaf nodes andΘ(log logn)
depth. Leaf nodes are denoted as height 0 and the height in-
creases going towards the root. This results in a total ofΘ(n)
nodes over all binary trees. Each node in the tree will be able
to store up to t = Θ(1) blocks. Furthermore, we pick the bi-
nary trees such that there are exactly n leaf nodes overall.
Finally, there is a single root node that has Θ(n/logn) chil-
dren corresponding to the roots of theΘ(n/logn) binary tree
roots. We denote this node as the super root. Unlike all other
nodes, the super root is stored on the client. We shall show
that the probability that the super root holdsmore thenΦ(n)
blocks for any Φ(n) = ω(logn) is negligible in n.
Each of the n buckets is uniquely associated with a leaf
node. The memory locations of a bucket consist of all the
blocks stored in the nodes on the unique path between the
leaf node and the super root. Therefore, a bucket consists
of Θ(log logn) server memory locations in addition to the
memory locations in the super root. We now describe our
new storing algorithm, S, given this bucket arrangement.
When inserting u, S places u into the node with minimal
height (that is, closest to the leaf nodes) in either of the buck-
ets in Π(u) with empty space. Note that u might end up be-
ing stored in the super root. If all the nodes of both buckets
of Π(u) are filled then the mapping scheme fails to store u.
We show that when inserting any set of at most n keys, if
we limit the capacity of the super root to Φ(n), for some
Φ(n) = ω(logn), the above mapping scheme fails with prob-
ability negl(n). The analysis adapts techniques from [5].
Theorem 7.2. Let Φ(n) = ω(logn). The probability that,
when inserting n keys, mapping scheme S places more than
Φ(n) keys into the super root is negl(n).
Proof. Our key observation is that a block is stored in
a level-(i+1) slot if and only if the two selected buckets are
filled up to level i . If we denote by Hi the number of filled
node at level i , the probability of selecting a bucket that is
filled up to level i isHi · 2i/n. For a block to be allocated to a
slot at level i +1, it must be the case that both selected buck-
ets are filled up to level i which has probability
(
Hi ·2i
n
)2
. For
convenience, we define the sequence βi by setting β0 =
n
e ·34
and βi+1 =
e
n ·β2i ·22(i+1), which we will use later in the proof.
First, we present a useful property about the sequence and
then we show that the probability that Hi > βi is negl(n).
The proof of Lemma 7.3 can be found in Appendix F.
Lemma 7.3. For all i ≥ 0,
βi =
n
e
·
(
2
3
)2i+2 (
1
2
)2(i+2)
.
Lemma 7.4. If βi = ω(logn) then, Pr[Hi > βi ] ≤ i/nω(1).
Proof. We proceed by induction on i . The base case i = 0
is established by setting c > 34 · e . We next upper bound the
probability that after inserting n blocks there are more than
βi+1 filled nodes at level i + 1, given that we start with Hi
nodes filled at level i . To do so, we define X j to be that 0/1
random variable that is 1 iff the j-th block ends up at level
i + 1. Clearly, Pr[X j = 1] =
(
Hi ·2i+1
n
)2
and, if Hi ≤ βi ,
µi+1 := E
[∑
j
X j
]
≤ β
2
i · 22(i+1)
n
=
βi+1
e
.
We thus have
Pr[Hi+1 > βi+1 | Hi ≤ βi ] ≤
Pr[Hi+1 > βi+1]
Pr[Hi ≤ βi ]
=
Pr[∑j X j > e · µi+1]
Pr[Hi ≤ βi ]
≤ e
−e ·βi+1
Pr[Hi ≤ βi ]
where the last inequality follows byTheoremA.2. By Lemma7.3,
the sequence βi decreases with i and thus βi ≥ βi+1 =
ω(logn). The proof is then completed by observing that
Pr[Hi+1 > βi+1]
≤ Pr[Hi+1 > βi+1 | Hi ≤ βi ] · Pr[Hi ≤ βi ] + Pr[Hi > βi ]
≤ 1/nω(1) + i/nω(1) ≤ (i + 1)/nω(1)
using our hypothesis that Pr[Hi > βi ] = i/nω(1). 
Wenow conclude the proof of Theorem 7.2. Fix a function
Φ(n) = ω(logn) and let i⋆ be the largest index such that
βi⋆ ≥ Φ(n). By Lemma 7.3, we obtain that i⋆ = Θ(log logn).
Following a reasoning similar to the one adopted in proof
of Lemma 7.4, we can prove that the expected number of
filled nodes at level i⋆ + 1 is at most βi⋆+1/e , given that no
more than βi⋆ nodes are filled at level i
⋆. By Lemma 7.4, the
condition holds except with negligible probability. From the
definition of βi⋆+1, we obtain that, for some constant α such
that c ≥ α · βi⋆+1, the probability that more than c nodes are
filled at level i⋆ + 1 is inverse exponential in c by Chernoff
Bounds, and thus negl(n). 
7.3 Wrapping up the Proof
We complete our DP-KVS construction by observing that
the mapping scheme described above has k(n) = 2, s(n) =
Θ(log logn) and c(n) = Φ(n) for any Φ(n) = ω(logn).
Theorem 7.5. The above KVS scheme is a ϵ-DP-KVS with
ϵ = O(logn) that returns O(log logn) blocks. The server uses
O(n) blocks of storage and, for any function Φ(n) = ω(logn),
the probabilty that the client stores more thanO(Φ(n)·log logn)
blocks is negl(n).
8 CONCLUSIONS
We consider privacy-preserving storage protocolswith small
overhead that could be implemented with large-scale, fre-
quently accessed storage infrastructures without negatively
impacting response times or resource costs. Our main ques-
tion is to find the best privacy that can be achieved by small
overhead storage schemes.
We formulate our privacy notion using differentially pri-
vate access, which is a generalization of the oblivious ac-
cess provided by both ORAM and PIR. We present strong
evidence that the best privacy achievable by any constant
overhead differentially private storage schemes must have
privacy budgets ϵ = Ω(logn). For DP-RAM and DP-IR, we
present constructionswith asymptotically optimal ϵ = Θ(logn)
privacy budgets andO(1) overhead. ForDP-KVS, we present
a scheme with asymptotically optimal ϵ = Θ(logn) privacy
budgets and only O(log logn) overhead which is exponen-
tially better than previous constructions. Our DP-KVS uses
a novel, oblivious variant of two-choice hashing that uses
only O(n) server storage that may be of independent inter-
est.
Therefore, we answer that the best privacy achievable by
privacy-preserving storage systems with small overhead is
differentially private access with ϵ = Θ(logn). On the other
hand, any storage scheme achieving stronger privacy most
likely must incur non-trivial overhead compared to plain-
text access.
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A TOOLS
In this section we briefly review some tools that we use in
the design and in the analysis of our constructions.
A.1 Power of Two Choices
The power of two choices concept was motivated from the
classical balls and bins problem. The balls and bins concepts
considersn balls and n bins. Each of then balls chooses a sin-
gle bin independently and uniformly at random. The load
of a bin is the number of balls that occupy the bin. It has
been shown that with high probability, the load of every bin
does not exceed O(logn/log logn) [21]. Consider the case
where each of the n balls now chooses two bins indepen-
dently and uniformly at random. The ball occupies the least
loaded of the two chosen bins. This slight alteration ensures
that with high probability, the load of each bin does not ex-
ceedO(log logn) [41]. This result demonstrates that having
two choices significantly improves bounds on the maximum
load. Furthermore, it turns out that increasing the number of
choices to d ≥ 3 only improves the maximum load bounds
by a constant. It is important to note that the allocation of
each is chosen independently from the allocation of all other
balls.
Theorem A.1. At any time, the load of any bin produced
by the power of two choices process exceeds O(log logn) with
probability at most 1/nΩ(log logn).
A.2 Chernoff Bound
The next theorem gives a bound on the tails of a binomial
distribution that we will use to analyze our constructions.
See [42] for a proof.
Theorem A.2. Let Xi , for i = 1, . . . ,n be independent bi-
nary random variables with Pr[Xi = 1] = p and let µ := np.
Then for every t ≥ µ , it holds that
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥ t
]
≤ µ
t
t t
· et−µ
and, in particular,
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥ e · µ
]
≤ e−µ .
B PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
We remind the reader that, for i ∈ [N ], IR(i) is the ran-
dom variable of the set of blocks transferred by the server
when the client wishes to access block Bi . We next compute
Pr[IR(i) = T] for a subset T of K blocks.
Case 1: Bi ∈ T . With probability 1 − α , we know that Bi ∈
T and the remaining K − 1 blocks are chosen uniformly at
random. On the other hand, with probability α , for Bi ∈ T ,
we need to choose Bi as one of the K blocks that are chosen
randomly. Therefore,
Pr[IR(i) = T] = 1 − α(N−1
K−1
) + α(N
K
) .
Case 2: Bi < T . In this case, we know with probability (1 −
α), T is not possible. With probability α , we need to ensure
that Bi is not one of the K blocks chosen. So,
Pr[IR(i) = T] = α(N
K
) .
Let Q and Q ′ be any two query sequences of length L for
which dH (Q,Q ′) = 1. Since, the above algorithm is stateless,
we know that its behavior depends solely on the query index.
Therefore, it suffices to consider two different sequences queries
of length one, q , q′ ∈ [N ]. If we choose a transcript T
such that Bq ,Bq′ < T or Bq ,Bq′ ∈ T , then we see that
Pr[IR(q) = T] = Pr[IR(q′) = T]. If, instead, Bq ∈ T and
Bq′ < T we have
Pr[IR(q) = T]
Pr[IR(q′) = T] ≤
(1 − α) (N
K
)
α
(N−1
K−1
) + 1 ≤ (1 − α)N
αK
+ 1 = eϵ .
Since this holds for any single transcript T , the same ratio
holds for any set of transcripts completing the proof.
C LOWER BOUND FOR
MULTIPLE-SERVER DP-IR
We extend the single server lower bound to the multiple
server IR model with D servers and DA adversarial servers.
IfDA = D, then the scenario collapses to the single adversar-
ial server case of Section 3.2. In this section, we assume that
DA < D and there is always at least one honest server. For
convenience, we define t = DAD to be the fraction of servers
corrupted by A where 0 < t < 1.
The choice of adversarial servers is modeled as a chal-
lenger C with a IR protocol and an adversary A with the
power to corrupt t fraction of servers. Using the knowledge
of IR but not the internal randomness of IR, A picks t frac-
tion of the D servers to corrupt. C then runs IR and A gets
the transcript of downloads sent by IR to the t fraction of
corrupted servers. We denote the adversary’s transcript on
query sequence Q as IRA(Q). We now proceed to present
our lower bound in the multi-server model.
Theorem C.1. If IR is a (ϵ, δ )-DP D-server IR in the balls
and bins model for any ϵ, δ ≥ 0 and error probability α <
1 − (δ/t), then IR performs
Ω
( ((1 − α)t − δ ) · n
eϵ
)
expected operations.
Proof. We prove our lower bound for the adversary A
that corrupts DA ≤ tD randomly and uniformly chosen
servers. We know
Pr[Bi ∈ IR(i)] ≥ 1 − α .
IfBi appears in IR
A(i), Pr[Bi ∈ IRA(i)] ≥ (1−α)t . The rest of
the proof follows identically to the proof of Theorem3.4. 
As a result, we show that the DP-IR scheme in [49] is
optimal when t is considered constant.
D REMAINING DP-RAM PROOFS
In this section we give the proofs that were postponed from
Section 6.We start by showing that the client usesO(c)mem-
ory except with negligible probability for c = ω(logn).
Lemma D.1. If p ≤ c
n
and c = ω(logn), then RAM stores
at mostO(c) blocks in the block stash on client storage at any
point in time except with negligible probability.
Proof. Pick any point in time.We note that each blockBi
has independent probability p of being stored in the client.
We letXi = 1 if and only if Bi is stored on the client memory.
Let X be the number of blocks stored in client memory, so
X = X1+. . .+Xn . So, we know thatE[X ] = E[X1+. . .+Xn] =
pn ≤ c . By Chernoff Bounds, for any δ > 0,
Pr[X > (1 + δ )c] ≤ exp
( −cδ 2
2 + δ
)
which is negl(n)when c = ω(logn). The lemma follows, by
a union bound over all points in time (that is, the length of
the queries which is polynomial in n). 
Proof of Lemma 6.4. Thenumerator is trivially upper bounded
by 1 and the denominator is lower bounded by the conjunc-
tive probability. We prove the lemma by showing that the
latter is at least p/n2. To this aim, we consider three cases
depending on the values of pr(Q, j) and opr(Q, j). Note that,
if pr(Q, j) , +∞, qpr(Q, j) = q j by definition.
Case 1: pr(Q, j) , +∞ and opr(Q, j) = qj .
Consider first the case d j = qj . If during the overwrite
phase of query pr(Q, j) block Bqj is stored in block stash
(and this has probability p), then RAMO
pr(Q, j)(Q) = q j with
probability 1/n. Then at the download phase of query j , Bqj
is found in block stash and therefore the probability that
RAMDj (Q) = qj is 1/n. On the other hand if during the
overwrite phase of query pr(Q, j) block Bqj is not stored
in block stash (this has probability 1 − p), then certainly
RAMO
pr(Q, j)(Q) = q j and, sinceBqj is not found in block stash
at the start of the download phase of query j ,RAMDj (Q) = q j
with probability 1. Altogether, we have Pr[RAMO
pr(Q, j)(Q) =
qj∧RAMDj (Q) = q j ] = 1−p+1/n3 ≥ 1/n3. If, instead,d j , q j
then it means that Bqj must have been stored in the block
stash during the overwrite phase of query pr(Q, j) (this has
probability p) and then RAMO
pr(Q, j)(Q) = q j with probability
1/n. Then, since Bqj is in stash at the start of the download
phase of query j RAMDj (Q) = d j with probability 1/n. Alto-
gether, we have Pr[RAMO
pr(Q, j)(Q) = q j ∧RAMDj (Q) = q j ] =
p/n2.
Case 2. pr(Q, j) , +∞ and opr(Q, j) , q j .
If opr(Q, j) , q j then it must be the case that, during the
overwrite phase of query pr(Q, j), blockBqj is stored in block
stash (and this happens with probability p) and opr(Q, j) is
chosen as overwrite block (and this happens with probabil-
ity 1/n). When the download phase of query j starts, block
Bqj is found in the stash and so the probability that d j is se-
lected as download blocks is 1/n. Whence Pr[RAMDj (Q) =
d j ∧ RAMOpr(Q, j)(Q) = opr(Q, j)] = p/n2.
Case 3. pr(Q, j) = +∞. In this case, opr(Q, j) =⊥ and Bqj has
not been queried before query j . Therefore, at the start of
the download phase of query j , Bqj is found in block stash
with probability p. By using arguments similar to the ones
of the previous cases, we have
Pr[RAMDj (Q) = q j ∧ RAMOpr(Q, j)(Q) =⊥]
= Pr[RAMDj (Q) = q j ] = (1 − p) + p/n
and, for d j , qj ,
Pr[RAMDj (Q) = d j ∧ RAMOpr(Q, j)(Q) =⊥]
=Pr[RAMDj (Q) = d j ] = p/n
which completes the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 6.5. As in the proof of the previous lemma,
we upper bound the numerator by 1 and show that the de-
nominator is at least n/p starting from the case oj = q j . If, in
the overwrite phase of the j-th query, block Bqj is added to
the block stash (and this happens with probability 1/n) then
the same block is chosen as overwrite blockwith probability
1/n. In the remaining 1 − p probability, qj is the overwrite
block with probability 1. Therefore Pr[RAMOj (Q) = qj ] =
(1−p)+p/n. If, instead, oj , qi , then the only case in which
oj is the overwrite block of phase j is when Bqj is added to
the block stash and this gives Pr[RAMOj (Q) = oj ] = p/n, for
every oj , qj . For any j , i ,Q j = Q
′
j showing the first point.
For any o, Pr[RAMOi (Q ′) = o] ≥ p/n giving the second re-
sult. 
E DP-RAM GENERALIZATION
Our proof of differential privacy ofDP-RAM of Section 6 can
be seen to give a more general form of differential privacy.
Suppose DP-RAM stores n blocks and there exists a reper-
toire Σ of sizeb = O(n).We interpret Σ as the specification of
b buckets where each bucket contains exactly s blocks. Note,
buckets may overlap and two different buckets may contain
the same block. Our privacy proof of DP-RAM carries over
to the case in which a query retrieves all blocks in a bucket.
In other words, we interpret query sequences Q of length
s · l as l subsequences each of length s taken from the Σ of
size n (that is, each subsequence corresponds to a bucket).
In this framework, a query sequence Q = (q1, . . . ,qs ·l ) is
associated with sequence Q = (σ1, . . . ,σl ) of length l over
Σ; that is,
Q = (q1, . . . ,qs︸     ︷︷     ︸
σ1
,qs+1, . . . ,q2·s︸          ︷︷          ︸
σ2
, · · ·q(l−1)s+1, . . . ,ql ·s︸               ︷︷               ︸
σl
),
and σ1,σ2, . . . ,σl ∈ Σ and |Σ| = b = O(n).
The proof of Section 6 handles the case s = 1 in which an
access sequence is a sequence of n requests taken from the
repertoire Σ = [n].
To argue the general case let us consider first the case
in which the server explicitly stores the subsequences of
Σ; specifically, each element of Σ is a sequence of s of the
original n blocks and each is stored using storage equal to
s blocks. Then an access sequence Q of length s · l over [n]
is simply an access sequence (σ1, . . . ,σl ) of length l over Σ
and, as it is easily seen, our proof still works and guarantees
differential privacy with ϵ = Θ(logn).
This approach, unfortunately, has the drawback that the
server storage grows by a factor of s . However, we observe
that the blocks that constitute the subsequence of Σ need
not to be explicitly stored by the server that instead can
store just the n original blocks and, each time it receives
a request σ ∈ Σ, the server fetches the needed blocks. Note
that this transformation preserves differential privacy with
ϵ = Θ(logn) as this property is independent of the actual
layout of the parts of the individual atomic blocks (in this
case the subsequences σ ∈ Σ) on which the RAM is built.
The only modification required is that when retrieving or
updating a bucket i , the DP-RAMmust also check if the any
block is stored on the client as part of another bucket j , i . If
so, the block on client storage must be returned as opposed
to the one from the server for retrievals. For updates, both
the server copy and client copy must be updated.
F REMAINING DP-KVS PROOFS
[Proof of Lemma 7.3] We proceed by induction and we ver-
ify the base case by plugging in i = 0. For i ≥ 0, we have
βi+1 =
e
n
· β2i · 22(i+1)
=
e
n
· n
2
e2
·
(
2
3
)2i+3 (
1
2
)4(i+2)
· 22(i+1)
=
n
e
·
(
2
3
)2i+3 (
1
2
)4(i+2)−2(i+1)
=
n
e
·
(
2
3
)2i+3 (
1
2
)2(i+3)
.
G DP-IR PSEUDOCODE
We present the pseudocode for our DP-IR scheme of Sec-
tion 5.
Algorithm 1 DP-IR.ery: read a block
Input: i, ϵ,α
Set T = ∅. {initializing the download set}
Pick random number r ∈ [0, 1].
if r > α then
T ← T ∪ {i}.
end if
Set K = ⌈(1 − α)N /(eϵ − 1)⌉.
while |T | < K do
Pick j uniformly at random from [N ] \ T .
T ← T ∪ {j}.
end while
Send T to server and receive {Bj }j∈T from server.
if r > α then
return Bi .
else
return ⊥.
end if
H DP-RAM PSEUDOCODE
We present the pseudocode for the algorithm in Section 6.
Algorithm 2 DP-RAM.Setup: initialize client and server
storage
Input: 1λ,B1, . . . ,BN
Randomly select K ← {0, 1}λ .
Initialize array A of size N on server.
Initialize hash table bStash on client.
for i ← 1, . . . ,N do
Set A[i] ← Enc(K ,Bi ).
Pick r uniformly at random from [N ].
if r ≤ C then
Set bStash[i] ← Bi .
end if
end for
Algorithm 3 DP-RAM.ery: reading and writing a data
block
Input: i, op,Bnew
{Download Phase}
if i ∈ bStash then
Pick d uniformly at random from [N ].
Download A[d] and discard.
Set B ← bStash[i] and remove i from bStash.
else
Set d ← i .
Download A[d].
Set B ← Dec(K ,A[d]).
end if
if op = write then
Set B ← Bnew .
end if
{Overwrite Phase}
Draw r uniformly at random from [N ].
if r ≤ C then
Set bStash[i] ← B.
Pick o uniformly at random from [N ].
DownloadA[o], decrypt it and re-encrypt it obtaing ct.
Upload ct as A[o].
else
Set o = i .
Download A[o] and discard it.
Set ct← Enc(K ,B).
Upload ct as A[o].
end if
